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We report on human-subject experiments on the problems of
coloring (a social differentiation task) and consensus (a social agreement task) in a networked setting. Both tasks can be viewed as
coordination games, and despite their cognitive similarity, we find
that within a parameterized family of social networks, network
structure elicits opposing behavioral effects in the two problems,
with increased long-distance connectivity making consensus easier
for subjects and coloring harder. We investigate the influence that
subjects have on their network neighbors and the collective outcome, and find that it varies considerably, beyond what can be explained by network position alone. We also find strong correlations
between influence and other features of individual subject behavior. In contrast to much of the recent research in network science,
which often emphasizes network topology out of the context of
any specific problem and places primacy on network position, our
findings highlight the potential importance of the details of tasks
and individuals in social networks.
behavioral game theory ∣ network science ∣ social networks

S

ocial organizations often need to perform coordination tasks
in a networked and decentralized fashion. Decentralization
introduces performance constraints, especially in situations
where communication channels are much sparser than in a fully
connected network, and it is of interest to researchers in sociology
and the emerging field of network science to understand how the
underlying networks affect collective performance.
We describe human-subject experiments in which decentralized coordination is modeled as the problems of coloring and
consensus on a parametrized family of networks. The coloring
problem may be viewed as a task of social differentiation or
minimizing overlap between members of a decentralized group,
while the consensus problem is a complementary task in which
agreement or overlap is deliberately sought. Thus the two tasks
entail local differentiation and global conformity respectively.
The (behavioral) coloring problem (1) requires each player in
a network to choose a color from a fixed set that differs from the
choice of all of their network neighbors, while consensus requires
selecting a color that agrees with all network neighbors. In our
experiments, each subject was assigned to a vertex in an exogenously chosen network, and given a financial incentive to strive for
a global solution to the problem, even while being restricted to
only their local neighborhood view of the network. It is worth
noting that with respect to centralized computation, the coloring
task is known to be NP-Complete, and thus likely computationally
intractable, while consensus is clearly trivial.
One of our main findings is that even though coloring and
consensus can both be viewed as forms of decentralized coordination, and the solution times of these problems varies with
network structure, the way in which it varies is quite different
in the two problems. Specifically, we find that as the networks
become less clustered and more random, decentralized coloring
becomes more difficult for humans to solve, while decentralized
consensus becomes easier. Thus network properties alone are
not sufficient to account for the observed patterns in collective
behavior; rather, the task itself is of vital importance, even
between two cognitively similar tasks. We also show that a simple
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model of individual behavior, when run in simulation on our
networks, can qualitatively capture this behaviorally observed
phenomenon.
Turning to aspects of individual rather than collective behavior, we also introduce natural notions of a player’s influence
on their neighbors and the outcome of an experiment, and study
the amount and origin of such influences. We find that the variation in influence across players is beyond what can be explained
by the variability in their network positions, and that this
influence is only weakly correlated with topological properties
of network position such as degree and centrality.
Taken together, our results highlight aspects of collective
behavior in network science that have been considered before
(2, 3), but are perhaps deemphasized recently in favor of purely
structural studies: namely, the potential primacy of task and agent
details in social networks.
Related Work
Decentralized coordination is a problem of long standing interest. There are a number of game-theoretic models of coordination, in which players receive a positive payoff if and only if they
can jointly coordinate on one of a collection of joint action
choices. An alternative classic model is a cooperative game, which
studies how players form coalitions. See Osborne and Rubenstein
(4) for well known examples. Of central interest to us are the
dynamics of the process by which players reach coordinated
choice and the role of networks in this process; neither is
informed by purely game-theoretic considerations.
While coordination games and cooperation in Prisoners
Dilemma and other games have been extensively studied with
human subjects over the years (5, 6–8), behavioral studies of
coordination on networks are more recent. Kearns et al. (1, 9)
study coloring and related problems on networks, although they
do not focus on a particular parameterized family of networks
as we do here. McCubbins et al. (10) and Kearns et al. (1) both
observe that adding connections makes the coloring problem
easier.
Experimental Methodology
The work described here continues a line of research at the University of Pennsylvania in controlled human-subject experiments
on strategic behavior in social networks (1, 9, 13). In such experiments, each subject sits at a networked workstation with only a
local (network neighborhood) view of the collective activity, and
has a financial incentive to contribute to a global solution.
In the coloring and consensus experiments we shall describe,
the networks used in each experiment were chosen from a stoAuthor contributions: S.J. and M.K. designed research; S.J. and M.K. performed research;
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Fig. 1. Three sample networks used in the experiments. The top one is the
baseline network, being a chain of cliques with q ¼ 0, from which all other
networks were derived by random edge rewiring. The second network had
q ¼ 0.1, and the third had q ¼ 0.2. The six numbered vertices are called “connectors,” and the five edges connecting them were retained in all networks.
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Collective Behavior and Network Structure
Whether the two problems could be solved in the allotted time,
and how long it would take to reach solutions, was a central question. All 18 coloring experiments ended with a global solution, as
did 17 of the 18 consensus experiments. Thus overall collective
performance was strong, a finding consistent with our previous
experiments on other problems and network structures (1, 9).
Turning next to the effects of network structure, our first main
result is shown in Fig. 4, which plots average solution time against
the rewiring parameter q. The key finding is that the coloring and
consensus tasks induce qualitatively opposite collective performance as a function of q: consensus appears to be much harder
at low values of q, and got easier as q increased. In contrast,
the coloring problem was easiest at low q. When the coloring
and consensus solution times are aggregated separately for
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All experiments were held in a single session lasting a total of
several hours with 36 University of Pennsylvania students as subjects. Each experiment had a fixed network in which subjects were
randomly assigned to vertices. The session was closely proctored
and physical partitions were erected to ensure no communication
between subjects, other than permitted by the system. In order
to eliminate coordination based on previous experimental outcomes (particularly important for the consensus games), a random permutation between the colors chosen by a subject and
the corresponding number of integer indices was chosen before
each experiment, and the integer indices used to determine global
state and solutions; thus what appears red to one player might
appear blue to another, even though all players have a locally
consistent view of the global state at all times. This randomization
destroys the possibility of establishing social conventions across
experiments, and renders any potential side communication
about colors or buttons meaningless.

Fig. 2. Structural properties of networks vs. rewiring parameter q. For each of
many values of q (x-axis) ranging from 0–1 (corresponding to x ¼ 100),
we sampled 100 random networks from our generative model using that
value of q, and computed a variety of structural measures. In order to permit
plotting on common axes, each quantity is normalized by its maximum and
minimum values across all q to lie between 0 and 1. The quantities
network diameter (blue plot), clustering coefficient (red) and minimum degree (magenta) all decrease rapidly with increasing q; while the quantities
maximum degree (cyan), standard deviation of degree (green) and ratio of
largest to smallest degree (black, and which can be interpreted as the ratio
of the largest to smallest probability in the stationary distribution of a random
walk on the network) all increase rapidly with q. This plot permitted
us to sample “interesting” values of q for our experiments. In particular,
the response to all quantities is greater at smaller q, so we sampled more densely there.
PNAS ∣ August 24, 2010 ∣
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chastic generative model whose baseline network is a chain of six
cliques (complete subnetworks) of six vertices each, for a total of
36 vertices. The model has a single parameter, a probability
q ∈ ½0;1. For any fixed value of q, each edge not connecting
two cliques in the baseline network is independently “rewired”
with probability q. To rewire an edge, one endpoint is randomly
selected to be replaced by another, chosen uniformly at random
from among the remaining 35 network vertices; thus regardless of
the value of q, the total number of edges is always preserved. See
Fig. 1 for details and sample networks drawn from this stochastic
model. Like many similar models from the literature (2), this
model allows us to smoothly move between highly clustered, “tribal” network topologies with only loose interclique communication (q ¼ 0) to networks that are essentially random and
unstructured, and dominated by “long-distance” links (q ¼ 1).
Compared to earlier experiments (1, 9), which employed more
heterogenous network structures, our parametric model here also
permits aggregating data from experiments with similar values of
q, which increases the statistical resolution of some of our tests.
For the experiments, we used values of q ∈ f0;0.1;0.2;0.4;
0.6;1g. These values were chosen so as to sample “interesting”
networks with respect to a number of commonly studied structural properties of networks such as diameter and clustering coefficient; see Fig. 2. For each of these six values for q, three
independent networks were generated from the rewiring model,
and each network used in one coloring and one consensus
experiment; thus both tasks were performed on an identical
set of 18 networks.
In the consensus experiments the collective objective was to
color all vertices the same color within three minutes. In the
coloring experiments, the collective objective was to color all
vertices with a color that was different from those of any of its
neighbors. Note that for coloring, there is a well defined minimum number of colors required for a solution to exist (the
so-called chromatic number of the particular network in question), and this was the number provided in each experiment.
For consensus, there is no obvious analogue, and one would
generally expect the problem to become more difficult the more
colors are provided; we arbitrarily allowed nine colors in each
consensus experiment.
In the consensus experiments each subject received two dollars
if a global (unanimous) consensus to any single color was
reached, and zero dollars otherwise. In the coloring experiments
subjects received two dollars if a valid global coloring was
reached, and zero dollars otherwise. The subjects were given
three minutes to reach a solution, although an experiment would
terminate as soon as a solution was reached (thus, most experiments took less than three minutes). Each player was given only a
local (neighborhood) view of the network. A screenshot of the
Graphical User Interface is shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 4. Average solution times (solid lines) for consensus and coloring
experiments. The dashed lines are from a behavioral model described in
the text.

rather quickly converge on just two or three of the nine available
colors, and most of the duration of the experiments involves a
protracted network battle between the colors of different cliques,
which each reach internal solutions rather quickly. A variety of
interesting collective and individual behaviors can be seen in
these visualizations; see the caption for detail.

Fig. 3. The Graphical User Interface for the coloring game showing a
typical local neighborhood; interfaces for the consensus game were similar
in every detail except the statement of the payoffs, and the number of color
buttons available.

q ∈ f0;0.1;0.2g (low q) and q ∈ f0.4;0.6;1g (high q), four separate
one-sided pairwise t-tests confirmed the statistical significance of
these claims: with confidence levels all at P < 0.02, coloring was
harder for high q than low q, consensus was harder for low q than
high q, and low q was harder for consensus than coloring; with
P < 0.07 confidence level high q was harder for coloring than
consensus. These tests simply confirm the significance of the
qualitative shapes and crossing point of the curves in Fig. 4.
We remark that we looked for learning trends in the performance
data and found very little; the correlation between solution time
and experiment index number was actually positive, but it was not
statistically significant.
It is natural to ask whether the observed collective behavior
can be at least qualitatively replicated in simulations of simple
behavioral models on the same network structures. We investigated a myopic heuristic for each vertex that selects a color resulting in the fewest immediate conflicts (defined as being
opposite colors in consensus, or the same color in coloring) with
neighbors. Updates of vertices are made asynchronously at probabilistically chosen times. The dashed lines in Fig. 4 show that
such simple models do indeed broadly approximate the human
collective behavior we observed: in both game types, the models
qualitatively track collective behavior over the full domain of q,
including the reversal of the relative difficulty of the two problems. Our simulations for the consensus game echo findings
of Watts (2) on what he calls the “density classification” problem.
We also remark that finding simulation models providing numerically better fits proved difficult, despite the investigation of
regressions permitting a number of behavioral state variables. Given our limited data, we were unable to discover models balancing simplicity with numerically accurate fits to both game types.
To further elucidate the behavioral dynamics of these games, in
Fig. 5 we present four visualizations of actual subject play in consensus experiments for small values of the rewiring parameter q
(thus, the highly clustered structure of the baseline network is
largely intact). In all images, we can observe that the subjects
14980 ∣
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Individual Behavior and Influence
Thus far we have reported performance results from a collective
viewpoint, but ultimately collective behavior is a result of interactions between individual human subjects. Given the nature of
our experiments, where a desired global state must be reached
through local network interactions, it is natural to focus on measures of influence that subjects exert on their neighbors and on
the collective outcome. The subject of individual influence is important enough to have spawned a substantial literature, particularly in the context of adoption cascades in networks (11, 12)
where a decision maker is seeking out the most influential agents.
Traditionally, the focus has been on identifying the relationships
between influence and network position measures such as degree
and centrality, viewing network position rather than individual
human actors as the primary force. In contrast, below we argue
that in our experiments it is people who are the primary conduits
of influence in networks, and thus that human factors, often
understudied in modern network science, may have much to
do with influence and the success or failure of cascades.
We studied two distinct notions of influence in our experiments. The first, which we shall call neighborhood influence,
attempts to measure the extent to which the actions of a player
apparently cause changes in the actions of his neighbors. Fix a
vertex i in a given network, and suppose that at some time t0 this
vertex or player changes their color to c, and that their next color
change to c0 ≠ c comes at time t1 > t0 . Now suppose that a
network neighbor j of i changes their color to c at some time t
lying in the interval ½t0 ;t1 . Then we will credit i with an amount
of influence equal to 1∕ðt − t0 Þ. The intuition here is that j has
adopted the current color of i, and that the amount of influence
we credit i with should diminish the longer this adoption took.
Note that under this definition, j could contribute more than
one influencing event to i (for instance, if j toggled back and forth
between c and another color during the interval ½t0 ;t1 ), and the
same color change by j could contribute influence credit to more
than one neighbor (for instance, if j had another neighbor i0 who
was also color c at time t). However, neither of these phenomena
diminishes the fact that the notion captures apparent temporal
influences between neighboring players.
In order to filter out potentially coincidental color changes, we
only credit i in the manner described if t − t0 is at least 1 s, an
approximation of human reaction time combined with system
display update latency (which was less than 100 ms). Finally, we
Judd et al.

Influence Variation by Subject and Position. Armed with these two
notions of influence, our first interest is to examine whether the
influence of an agent can be understood as arising primarily from
their position in the network, or is to a significant extent a property of the actual human subject. In our experimental methodology, human subjects are randomly assigned to vertices at the
beginning of each experiment. This policy helps to separate
the effect of the human from the effect of the vertex (network
position).
For each of our two notions of influence, we use a standard
ANOVA test to detect whether variability of average influence
among the 36 human subjects exceeds the variability of influence
due to experimental conditions, such as random assignments of
subjects to network vertices.
For neighborhood influence, we find that human subject variability is significant in coloring games (with P < 0.001), but not
consensus games; while for outcome influence, human variation
is significant with P < 0.05 in both game types. We conclude that
overall, influence is not a product of just an agent’s network position, but arises from their intrinsic human behavioral patterns
as well.
Correlates of Influence. Our two measures of influence quantify the
(apparent) effects of a player or vertex on other players or vertices. We now examine a number of correlates of influence that
are determined only by a player’s own actions, or their apparent
reaction to their neighbors.
For instance, consider the change rate or instability of a player
or position, which is the number of color changes per second in
Judd et al.

an experiment. For this measure we again find that human
variation is significant under a standard ANOVA test, and
furthermore that the change rate of a human subject is strongly
negatively correlated with both their neighborhood and outcome
influence in both game types (correlations ranging from −0.40 to
−0.51 depending on the influence and game type, all with
P < 0.02). We thus conclude that more stable players exhibit
greater influence. Note that this finding is not obvious a priori,
since neighborhood influence is already normalized for change
rate, and for outcome influence the least stable players may still
settle on their final color relatively early.
We also examined the notion of stubbornness, defined as the
proportion of time that a player or vertex chooses a “noncompliant” color. In consensus, a color is noncompliant if there is
another played by more neighbors. In coloring, a color is noncompliant if there is another played by fewer neighbors. As with
change rate, we find stubbornness variation among subjects to
be significant, and stubbornness is strongly negatively correlated
with both influence types (−0.45 for neighborhood influence,
−0.50 for outcome influence, both with P < 0.02) in consensus
games (but not in coloring games). Thus it appears that rather
than causing others to react to or coalesce around their noncompliant choices, stubborn players reduce their impact on their
neighbors and the outcome of experiments.
Despite the fact that human variation in influence cannot be
explained by network position alone, and that there appear to be
a number of other behavioral traits that strongly correlate with
influence, it remains reasonable to ask what purely structural
properties of network position still have some explanatory value.
The degree of a vertex is only weakly correlated with influence in
consensus games (0.21 for neighborhood influence, 0.10 for outcome influence, both with P < 0.03). Also, degree is not significantly correlated with either type of influence in coloring games.
Vertex centrality (average inverse shortest path distance to all
other vertices) is significantly correlated only with outcome influence in consensus games (0.26 with P < 0.03). The clustering
coefficient of a vertex, which can be viewed as a measure of connectivity in a vertex’s neighborhood, is significantly correlated
only with outcome influence (0.086, P < 0.05 in coloring,
−0.22, P < 0.001 in consensus). Similarly, being one of the “connector” vertices between cliques in the baseline network before
rewiring is correlated only with neighborhood influence in consensus games (0.17, P < 0.03). The evidence again suggests that
influence seems more determined by the behavioral characterisPNAS ∣ August 24, 2010 ∣
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define the overall neighborhood influence of a player in a given
experiment to be the sum of all the influence credits as described,
divided by its degree and number of color changes; thus the
measure is already normalized to compensate for either a large
number of neighbors or players who change color frequently.
Our second measure of influence is called outcome influence,
and is simply the amount of time elapsed between a player’s final
color change and the end of the experiment. We thus attribute the
most credit to those players who anticipate the eventual global
solution, and thus may have participated in its creation. Under
this definition, the outcome influence of the last player to complete a global solution is zero. Note that neighborhood influence
depends intimately on network structure, while outcome influence does not do so in any obvious or direct way.

COMPUTER SCIENCES

Fig. 5. Progression of vertex colors in four consensus experiments. The x-axis measures experiment duration (thus image width is proportional to time to
completion), and there is a horizontal row for each of the 36 players showing its current color at each moment of the experiment. The first two images are for
rewiring parameter q ¼ 0, and the last two for q ¼ 0.1. Players in the same clique (before any rewiring) are in six consecutive rows, thus explaining the overall
tendency for such blocks of six to change colors in approximate unison. In the (successful) leftmost experiment, we see a rapid reduction from 9 to 3 and then
just 2 colors used by the population; a long stalemate between two halves of the network is gradually broken by yellow cliques adopting brown. The second
image shows the only consensus experiment out of 18 total to not successfully complete. Again we see a rapid reduction to 3 and then 2 colors, but this time the
dynamics are much richer; shortly before the halfway mark, we see that blue is chosen by the vast majority of the subjects but there remains an orange holdout
clique. A short while later, this clique has adopted blue, but not before causing a cascade of orange to ripple through the network, where it then proceeds to
take hold and in fact constitute the majority near the end of the time limit. The rightmost two images (where q ¼ 0.1) complete significantly faster (consistent
with the reported overall effect of q on consensus games), and show similar overall dynamics but with more mixing and experimentation by subjects. The
images also reveal interesting acts of individual behavior, including attempts at signalling and apparently “irrational” experimentation such as playing a color
not chosen by anyone else in the network.

tics of actual human subjects than by the abstract properties of
network position.
An interesting related question is to what extent influence, as
well as the measures of individual behavior above, correlate with
the time the subjects took to reach a global solution. Stubbornness and change rate (averaged for each experiment) both exhibit
strong negative correlation with running time in both games
(correlations ranging from −0.81 to −0.66 with P < 0.005); stubbornness and instability seem to adversely affect decentralized
coordination. On the other hand, we did not find significant
correlation between running time and neighborhood influence
in either game.

collective performance in two similar coordination tasks, and that
the intrinsic behavioral traits of human actors may play a stronger
role in their relative influence than purely structural properties of
their network position. Both findings suggest the potential
benefits of broadening the current emphasis of network science
on topology. We would further note that our controlled experimental methodology—allowing us to systematically vary network
structure across the same pool of human subjects—was crucial
to the findings, since it placed the same subject in many different
network positions throughout the session. Empirical field studies
measuring only the structure and behavior within a single, fixed
social network are handicapped in this regard.

Conclusion
The results presented here have shown that simple and systematic
changes in social network structure can elicit opposing effects on
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